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Abstract. This paper considers the scenario that multiple data owners wish to apply a machine
learning method over the combined dataset of all owners to obtain the best possible learning output
but do not want to share the local datasets owing to privacy concerns. We design systems for the
scenario that the stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm is used as the machine learning method
because SGD (or its variants) is at the heart of recent deep learning techniques over neural networks.
Our systems differ from existing systems in the following features: (1) any activation function can be
used, meaning that no privacy-preserving-friendly approximation is required; (2) gradients computed by
SGD are not shared but the weight parameters are shared instead; and (3) robustness against colluding
parties even in the extreme case that only one honest party exists. We prove that our systems, while
privacy-preserving, achieve the same learning accuracy as SGD and hence retain the merit of deep
learning with respect to accuracy. Finally, we conduct several experiments using benchmark datasets,
and show that our systems outperform previous system in terms of learning accuracies.
Keywords: Privacy preservation, stochastic gradient descent, distributed trainers, neural networks.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) and its variants are important methods in machine learning. In
recent years, these methods have become vital tools in deep learning based on neural networks,
producing surprisingly high learning accuracy.
While crucial for SGD and machine learning in general, accumulating a massive collection of
data in one central location is not easy for several reasons including the issue of data privacy. In
such cases, it is more desirable to keep the data in its original location while making use of it.
In this paper we assume that there are L distributed datasets owned by L trainers. Each trainer
aims to apply SGD to all L datasets to maximize the learning accuracy; while not wishing to share
its own dataset to minimize the risk of data leakage.
Activation functions inside neural networks are crucial for making the networks learn effectively.
Depending on the specific dataset, one activation function may empirically work better than others.
Therefore, it is important to be able to choose the activation function when training neural networks.
Ideally, when designing protocols for privacy-preserving SGD and its variants, there is no restriction
such as privacy-preserving friendliness imposed on activation functions.
Placing no restrictions on activation functions, Shokri and Shmatikov [2] presented a system
for privacy-preserving asynchronous SGD in which an honest-but-curious server is employed to
hold the gradients computed by SGD using local data. The system of Shokri and Shmatikov is
? This is the full version of a conference paper [1].
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Table 1. Privacy-preserving distributed deep learning systems.
Paper Use of cryptography Activation Security against Security against Trainer
function honest-but-curious server collusion transmission
[2] Transport Layer Security (TLS) Any No No (Parts of) Gradients
[4] Additively homomorphic encryption & TLS Any Yes No (Encrypted) Gradients
This paper Transport Layer Security (TLS) Any Yes Yes Weights
designed to share only a part of local gradients with the server, and their experiments show that it
is sufficient to obtain high accuracy for real datasets such as the MNIST dataset containing images
of handwritten digits [3].
Shokri and Shmatikov [2] did not use cryptographic tools such as secret sharing or homomorphic
encryption in their system. As the minimum to protect the communication between trainers and
the server, standard Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used. As a result, they wrote: “Our system
achieves this [privacy goal] at a much lower performance cost than cryptographic techniques such
as secure multi-party computation or homomorphic encryption and is suitable for deployment in
modern large-scale deep learning.” We follow their footsteps, aiming to use only TLS when designing
our privacy-preserving systems, as shown in Table 1.
1.2 Our contributions
We propose two novel systems for privacy-preserving SGD to protect the local data of all trainers.
Similar to the system in [2] and its enhanced variant [4], our systems can handle any activation
function. However, very different from the systems in [2,4], in our systems the trainers do not share
gradients but share the weights of the neural network. Our systems are called the SNT system and
FNT system, depending on the connection with Server-aided Network Topology (SNT) or Fully-
connected Network Topology (FNT) among the trainers. The SNT and FNT systems are described
in Section 4, and have the following properties of security and accuracy. In addition, a comparison
with the systems in [2, 4] is given in Table 1.
• Security against an honest-but-curious server (in SNT). Our SNT system leaks no infor-
mation on both the trained weight parameters and the data of participants to an honest-but-curious
server. See Theorem 1.
• Security against extreme collusion (both SNT and FNT). Even in the extreme case
that only one trainer (wlog., called trainer 1) is honest, and the other trainers and the server are
honest-but-curious, it is difficult to recover the local data of honest trainer 1. See Theorems 2 and
4.
As a special case, this property also ensures that a possibly honest-but-curious trainer cannot
recover the data of the others. In addition, it is easy to combine results [5] on differentially private
SGD with our systems as noted in Section 4.3, so that local data items can be protected in the
sense of differential privacy.
• Accuracy (both SNT and FNT). Our systems achieve identical accuracy to SGD trained
over the joint dataset of all participants. See Theorems 3 and 5.
Experiments with UCI datasets and image datasets (MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100).
In Section 5, we conduct a number of experiments using several benchmark datasets to demonstrate
the general applicability of our systems. Specifically, using UCI datasets, we show that the accuracy
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of our systems outperforms the previously reported results in [6] for the task of privacy-preserving
classification.
Using a multilayer perceptron (MLP) and a convolutional neural network (CNN) over the
MNIST dataset of 50,000 images of handwritten digits, the running time of our system is less than
three times that of the original SGD while maintaining learning accuracies.
Using deeper neural networks such as ResNet over the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets, we
show that the overheads of cryptographic operations and transmissions are very little compared
to the training on plain data. In addition, the learning accuracies are kept complying with known
results in the literature.
1.3 Technical overview
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD), no privacy protection. In SGD, the weight parameters
(flattened to a vector) W for the neural network are initialized randomly. At each iteration, gradient
G is computed by using a data item and the current W , and then the weight vector is updated as
follows:
W := W − α ·G (1)
where α is a scalar called the learning rate. The updating process is repeated until a desired
minimum for a predefined cost function based on cross-entropy or squared error is reached.
Shokri-Shmatikov systems. In the system of [2][Sect. 5] with one central server and many
distributed trainers, the server stores a weight vector Wserver. The update rule in (1) is modified as
follows:
Wserver := Wserver − α ·Gselectivelocal (2)
in which vector Gselectivelocal contains a selected (say 1% ∼ 10%) part of the locally computed gradients.
The update using (2) allows each participant to choose which gradients to share globally with the
hope of reducing the risk of leaking sensitive information on the participant’s local dataset to the
honest-but-curious server. However, as shown in [4], such selected gradients may result in leaking
information on the local data.
In [2][Sect. 7], Shokri and Shmatikov showed an additional technique of using differential privacy
as a countermeasure against indirect leakage from gradients. Their strategy was to add Laplace
noises1 to Gselectivelocal at (2). However, because secrecy and differential privacy are orthogonal, still
there is potential for leakage.
To solve the problem of data leakage from gradients, Phong et al. [4] proposed that one can
use additively homomorphic encryption to protect gradients from the honest-but-curious server.
However, even with homomorphic encryption, the system in [4] is still weak against the collusion of
an honest-but-curious server and some honest-but-curious trainers. Indeed, from (2), if the colluding
parties know the current and previous weight parameters, then they can compute the selective
gradients of other (honest) trainers.
Our systems. Our approach is very different from those of [2,4], because trainers do not share the
gradients (either plain or encrypted) but instead share the weights. In our SNT system in Section
1 In fact, it turns out that the parameter  of -differential privacy in [2] can be as large as 600,000, guaranteeing
no meaningful privacy as showed in [7].
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4, we make use of the following weight update process: each trainer i takes the current Wserver from
the server and initially sets its weight vector as
W (i) := Wserver (3)
then the trainer repeatedly performs the local training for W (i) using its local dataset via SGD,
W (i) := W (i) − α ·Glocal (4)
and uploads W (i) to the server to replace Wserver, namely
Wserver := W
(i). (5)
The trained weights may be proprietary and should be kept secret from those who are not trainers
(e.g., the server in our setting). To this end, the trainers will use a shared symmetric key (kept
secret from the server) to encrypt W (i) and Wserver using (3) and (5). The local update in (4) by
each trainer can be performed as is after decryption because the trainer holds the decryption key.
Thus, the honest-but-curious server will only handle ciphertexts without knowing the secret key
and hence it will obtain no information on the datasets. The process in (3), (4), and (5) can be
succinctly described as the process of updating the weight vector Wserver using the data of trainer
i. If all trainers repeat the process, then Wserver is trained over the combined datasets of all trainers
as desired. This final Wserver is known to all trainers owing to the shared symmetric key.
Because of the repeated application of (4), sharing weights is intuitively equivalent to sharing
a weighted sum of all gradients. Therefore, from a privacy-preserving perspective, shared weights
are more robust against information leakage. Indeed, we prove in Theorems 2 and 4 that inverting
local data from the weights can be seen as the problem of solving a system of nonlinear equations,
where the number of equations is smaller than the number of variables (data items).
1.4 Difference with the conference version
An abridged version of this paper was in [1]. This version improves [1] in the following ways: (1)
we add the FNT system and compare with the SNT system; (2) we state and prove that our
systems are relatively robust against the extreme collusion of trainers in Theorems 2 and 4; (3)
we consider additional hedges with respect to the weight privacy for our systems in Section 4.4,
in which the techniques of dropouts and no overfitting are extensively used in later experiments;
(4) to demonstrate the wide applicability of our systems we add the experiments on UCI datasets,
showing that the accuracies of our systems are better than those of [6, 8] regarding the task of
classification; (5) we add the experiments on the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets, showing that
cryptographic operations and transmissions in our systems incur very little overhead compared to
training over plain data when neural networks become deeper.
2 Other related works
Abadi et al. [5] (modifying and extending [9,10]) proposed differentially private SGD to protect the
trained weight parameters when the data is centralized, which is orthogonal but complementary to
this work. Indeed, each trainer in our system can locally use the techniques of [5,9,10] as discussed
in Section 4.4.
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Gilad-Bachrach et al. [11] presented a system called CryptoNets, which allows homomorphically
encrypted data to be feed forward to an already-trained neural network. Because CryptoNets as-
sumes that the weights in the neural network have been trained beforehand, the system aims to
make predictions for individual data items. The goals of our paper and [2,4] differ from that of [11],
as our systems and that of Shokri and Shmatikov exactly aim to train the weights utilizing multi-
ple data sources, while CryptoNets [11] does not. In the same vein of research, the works [12–15]
examined secure neural network prediction.
Hitaj et al. [16], employing generative adversarial networks, showed that sharing gradients are
dangerous in collaborative learning, thus emphasizing the observation in [4]. Chang et al. [17] also
independently proposed a system similar to our FNT system, without any security analysis.
Aono et al. [6,8] used a polynomial approximation for logistic regression so that they could design
a privacy-preserving system for classification tasks. Owing to the polynomial approximation, the
classification accuracy was inferior to that of the original logistic regression especially when the
data dimension increased. Hesamifard et al. [18] used polynomial approximation for continuous
activation functions.
Using a two-server model, Mohassel and Zhang [19] proposed protocols for privacy-preserving
linear regression, logistic regression, and an MLP in which secure-computation-friendly activation
functions were employed. For example, they used an approximation for the logistic function. There
were no experimental results on CNNs reported in [19] perhaps owing to the hurdles of implementing
the Fast Fourier Transform in the case of secure computation. Subsequently, Mohassel and Rindal
also considered a three-server model in [20].
Using secret sharing, Bonawitz et al. [21] proposed a secure aggregation method and applied
it to deep neural networks to aggregate user-provided model updates. In [21] the trained weight
parameters appear in plaintext on a central server which may be undesirable in many scenarios [22],
while in our systems this is not the case. The communication cost in our systems can be O(1)
(namely, independent of the number of trainers) per weight update, while it is O(Ntrainer) in [21],
where Ntrainer is the number of trainers.
Transfer learning is a method in machine learning where a pretrained weight of a neural network
over a dataset is reused in another neural network over a different dataset. For example, a pretrained
weight for classifying cars can be loaded into a related but different neural network for the task of
classifying buses. The reasoning in this example is that the pretrained weight have been optimized
to “understand” the components of cars, so should be useful for learning and classifying buses. Our
systems share the principle of reusing weight in transfer learning, but have the difference that all
the neural networks of the trainers are identical for the same task.
3 Preliminaries
We recall a few preliminaries on cryptography and machine learning in this section.
Symmetric encryption. Symmetric encryption schemes consist of the following (possibly prob-
abilistic) poly-time algorithms: KeyGen(1λ) takes a security parameter λ and generates the secret
key K; Enc(K,m), equivalently written as EncK(m), produces c which is the ciphertext of message
m; Dec(K, c) returns message m encrypted in c.
Ciphertext indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks [23] (or CPA security for short) en-
sures that no information is leaked from ciphertexts. We will use symmetric encryption as provided
by TLS.
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Fig. 1. Neural network with activation function f .
Neural networks. Figure 1 shows a neural network with 5 inputs, 2 hidden layers, and 2 outputs.
The node with +1 represents the bias term. The neuron (including the bias2) nodes are connected
via weight variables W . In a deep-learning structure of a neural network, there can be multiple
layers each with thousands of neurons. Each neuron node (except the bias node) is associated with
an activation function f . Typical examples of f are
[ReLU] f(z) = max{0, z}
[leaky ReLU] fβ(z) =
{
z if z > 0
βz if z ≤ 0
[sigmoid] f(z) =
ez
ez + 1
[tanh] f(z) =
ez − e−z
ez + e−z
.
The nonlinearity of these activation functions is important for the network to learn complicated
data distributions.
The learning task is, given a training dataset, to determine these weight variables to minimize a
predefined cost function such as the cross-entropy or the squared error cost function [24]. The cost
function defined over one data item data = (x, y) with input x and truth value y will be written as
J(W,x, y) in which W is the weight parameters.
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) (see also [24]). Let W be the weight parameters and let
G ← δJ(W,x,y)δW be the corresponding gradients of the cost function J(W,x, y) with respect to the
variables in W . The variable update rule in SGD is as follows for a learning rate α(t) ∈ R at time
t:
W ←W − α(t) ·G
in which α(t) ·G is component-wise multiplication. The learning rate α(t) can be a constant or can
be changed adaptively.
2 It is possible to exclude the bias nodes and use a separate variable b (see, for example, [24]).
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To make SGD work more efficiently, a typical technique is to use vectorization via a mini-
batch of data instead of a single data item. Namely, multiple data items (e.g., 256) are packed
correspondingly into matrices (X,Y ) and then the following processes are carried out:
(compute the gradient) G← δJ(W,X, Y )
δW
(6)
(update the weight) W ←W − α(t) ·G (7)
where α(t) is the learning rate at time t.
4 Our proposed systems: privacy-preserving SGD via weight transmission
We propose two systems for privacy-preseving SGD: one with a Server-aided Network Topology
(SNT) and the other with Fully-connected Network Topology (FNT) in which each connection is
via a separate TLS/SSL channel. The SNT system makes use of an honest-but-curious server (e.g.,
cloud server) while the FNT system does not. One trade-off is given in Table 2. The SNT system
may be suitable when the number of trainers L is large (say ≥ 20), while the FNT system may be
suitable for relatively small L (say ≤ 20).
In both SNT and FNT, we assume that the datasets of the trainers have the same column
(feature) format. In other words, the datasets are horizontally distributed.
Table 2. Properties of the SNT and FNT systems.
System Central server needed? Number of TLS connections
Our SNT system Yes L
Our FNT system No L(L− 1)/2
4.1 Our Server-aided Network Topology (SNT) system
The system is depicted in Figure 2. There is one common server and multiple distributed trainers.
The server is assumed to be honest-but-curious: it is honest in its operation but curious regarding
data. Each trainer is connected with the server via a separate communication channel such as
a TLS/SSL channel. The symmetric key K is shared between trainers and is kept secret to the
server. Notationally, EncK(·) is a symmetric encryption with key K, which protects the weight
vector against the honest-but-curious server. The training data of the trainers is used only locally,
while the encrypted weight vector EncK(W ) is sent back and forth between the server and the
trainers. The weight vector W needs to be initialized once, which can be carried out by one of the
trainers by simply initializing W randomly and sending EncK(W ) to the server. The server either
can schedule the trainer order, or can do that randomly: after receiving the weight from a trainer
i, the server uniformly and randomly chooses a trainer j 6= i to transmit the weight.
In Figures 2 and 4,Dataseti can be either the whole local dataset of trainer i, or just a set of a few
data batches randomly chosen from the local dataset. If the local datasets are equally distributed,
then the former case is preferred; otherwise if the local datasets are not equally distributed, then
the latter case may be preferred for good accuracy. The concrete choice of Dataseti should depend
on the datasets in each specific application.
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Figure 1: Star Network Topology
Server
Trainer 1
Trainer 2Trainer 3
...
Trainer 5L
Figure 2: Star Network Topology
1
Trainer i holding Dataseti (1 ≤ i ≤ L)
get EncK(W ) from the server
decrypt to obtain weight W
for mini-batch (X,Y ) in Dataseti:
[compute gradient] G← δJ(W,X,Y )
δW
[update weight] W ←W − α(t) ·G
endfor
send EncK(W ) to server
Server (honest-but-curious)
global encW
while True:
get connection from a trainer
if trainer sends EncK(W ):
encW ← EncK(W )
endif
if trainer gets encW :
send encW to trainer
endif
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2. Our proposed SNT system with Server-aided Network Topology where all connections are
via secure channels such as TLS: (a) many distributed trainers connected with a central server;
(b) description of a trainer; (c) description of the central server.
Each trainer stores the updated weight vector W at each round, then uses a testing dataset to
locally check whether or not W has achieved good accuracy (and check overfitting as well). Finally,
the best W can be shared among the trainers via a separate communication channel if required.
The following theorems establish the properties for the security and accuracy of our systems.
Theorem 1 (Security against the honest-but-curious server, SNT system). In our system
in Figure 2, the honest-but-curious server learns no information on the local datasets of the trainer.
Proof. The honest-but-curious server passively handles ciphertexts of a symmetric encryption scheme.
Therefore, it obtains no information from the ciphertexts if the symmetric encryption scheme has
security against chosen plaintext attacks. uunionsq
Theorem 2 (Security against extreme collusion, SNT system). In our system in Figure 2,
suppose that only Trainer 1 is honest and the others (Server and Trainers 2, . . . , L) are malicious.
Even with such collusion, the colluding others cannot recover any data item of honest Trainer 1
unless they solve a nonlinear equation (or a subset sum problem).
Proof. Referring to Figure 2(b), what the colluding parties (namely, Server and Trainers 2, . . . , L)
obtain from Trainer 1 is the initial weight and output weight. These weights are linked via a number
of gradient descent update steps. Concretely, let the initial weight be W0 = W
(init), the final weight
be Wn = W
(final), and (Xi, Yi) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be the randomly shuffled mini-batches from Dataset1
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from the current epoch. Then, the gradient descent update steps are as follows:
G1 ← δJ(W0, X1, Y1)
δW
W1 ←W0 − α1G1
...
Gi ← δJ(Wi−1, Xi, Yi)
δW
Wi ←Wi−1 − αiGi
...
Gn ← δJ(Wn−1, Xn, Yn)
δW
Wn ←Wn−1 − αnGn
in which the scalar αi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) can be equal or different depending on the learning rate schedule
of Trainer 1. Reversely,
W (final) = Wn
= Wn−1 − αnGn
= Wn−2 − αn−1Gn−1 − αnGn
...
= W0 − (α1G1 + · · ·+ αnGn)
= W (init) − (α1G1 + · · ·+ αnGn). (8)
In short, even though the colluding parties know W (final) and W (init), they can only compute the
weighted sum of gradients
W (init) −W (final) = α1G1 + · · ·+ αnGn (9)
in which n = |Dataset1|/batch size 1 in our expected applications. In (9), the local dataset and
hence each gradient Gi is kept secret, and even αi may vary secretly depending on the learning
rate schedule of Trainer 1. Recovering any data item of Dataset1 from equation (9) is the problem
of solving non-linear equation stated in the theorem statement.
As seen from (8), releasing neural network weight parameters can be seen as publishing a
weighted sum of gradients and the initial weight. Therefore, computing any data item given the
weight parameters is also a subset sum problem. uunionsq
Remark: data inversion given weights and subset sum problem. While inverting data from
weight parameters is considered hard implicitly in the literature, to our knowledge, this is the first
time such a relation between data secrecy (given weight parameters) and a subset sum problem has
been made explicit as in Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 (Accuracy of the SNT system). Our system in Figure 2 functions as running
SGD on the combined dataset of all local datasets.
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Proof. Our system in Figure 2 (when removing all encryption and decryption) functions as the
left pseudocode in Figure 3. In addition, the right pseudocode is the equivalent version via setting
CombinedDataSet = Dataset1 ∪ · · · ∪DatasetL.
Initialize W randomly
for mini-batch (X,Y ) in Dataset1:
G← δJ(W,X,Y )
δW
W ←W − α(t) ·G
endfor
...
for mini-batch (X,Y ) in DatasetL:
G← δJ(W,X,Y )
δW
W ←W − α(t) ·G
endfor
Initialize W randomly
Set CombinedDataSet = Dataset1 ∪ · · · ∪DatasetL
for mini-batch (X,Y ) in CombinedDataSet:
G← δJ(W,X,Y )
δW
W ←W − α(t) ·G
endfor
Fig. 3. Pseudocodes for the proof of Theorem 3.
In the right pseudocode, the loop (for ... endfor) is exactly one epoch of SGD, namely one
pass over all data items in CombinedDataSet. Therefore, our system in Figure 2 functions as
running SGD as described in Section 3 on the combined dataset CombinedDataSet of all trainers,
completing the proof. uunionsq
4.2 Our Fully-connected Network Topology (FNT) system
The system is depicted in Figure 4. There is no central server; thus there is no need to use symmetric
encryption to encrypt the weights as in Figure 2, but the trainers still need secure channels such
as TLS to transfer the weights to each other. Because there is no central server, the trainers must
agree the order of sending and receiving weight parameters in advance, for example, 1→ 2→ · · · →
L→ 1→ · · · ; or simply do transmission in a random order: trainer i takes uniformly and randomly
a number r in {1, . . . , L} \ {i} and sends its weight parameters to trainer r. Each trainer receives a
weight from the previous trainer, and updates that weight using mini-batches of data from its own
dataset, then sends the updated weight to the next trainer. Chang et al. [17] also independently3
proposed a system similar to our FNT system but without any security analysis.
Theorem 4 (Security against extreme collusion, FNT system). In our system in Figure 4,
suppose that only Trainer 1 is honest and the others (Trainers 2, . . . , L) are malicious. Even with
such collusion, the (malicious) others cannot recover any data item of the honest Trainer 1 unless
they solve a nonlinear equation (or a subset sum problem).
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Theorem 2. uunionsq
Theorem 5 (Accuracy of the FNT system). Our system in Figure 4 functions as running
SGD on the combined dataset of all local datasets.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Theorem 3. uunionsq
3 To be precise regarding time, the work [17] appeared after the conference version [1] of this paper.
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Trainer i holding Dataseti (1 ≤ i ≤ L)
get weight W from the previous trainer
for mini-batch (X,Y ) in Dataseti:
[compute gradient] G← δJ(W,X,Y )
δW
[update weight] W ←W − α(t) ·G
endfor
send weight W to the next trainer
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. Our proposed FNT system with Fully-connected Network Topology where all connections
are via secure channels such as TLS: (a) many distributed trainers connected with each other; (b)
description of a trainer.
4.3 Additional considerations for our SNT and FNT systems
Below are some additional considerations for our systems, which can be employed depending on
the specific application and its requirements.
Local epochs and central epochs. An epoch is one pass over all data items in a dataset in the
training process. Accordingly, one local epoch is one pass over a local dataset, while one central
epoch is one pass over the combined dataset of all trainers. While we consider the number of local
epochs as 1 in the above description of our systems for simplicity, it can be set to any number
if required, allowing each trainer to perform multiple passes over its dataset before sending the
weights to the next trainer. The training dataset is shuffled randomly before each local epoch.
Similarly, it is possible that the number of central epochs is larger than 1, meaning that there
are multiple passes over the trainers. When the number of central epochs is k ≥ 1, instead of
equation (9), the following equations are known to the colluding parties when assuming that only
Trainer 1 is honest:
V1 = α1G
(1)
1 + · · ·+ αnG(1)n
...
Vk = α1G
(k)
1 + · · ·+ αnG(k)n
(10)
where G
(1)
1 , . . . , G
(1)
n , . . . , G
(k)
1 , . . . , G
(k)
n are unknown gradients depending on the mini-batches of
data. As the neural network contains nonlinear activation functions, the above can be seen as a
system of nonlinear equations of unknown data items. Solving this system of equations is expected
to be hard because typically the number of unknowns (i.e. the cardinality of each local dataset) is
larger than the number of central epochs k (see Table 3 for concrete values); and the right-hand
side of each equation is non-polynomial.
Local data augmentation. Deep learning is often referred to as a “data hunger”, and it is not
hard for a neural network to overfit a training dataset. To deal with the problem of overfitting
11
Table 3. The number of unknowns and equations in (10). In all cases, #unknowns > #equations.
If each unknown is a real vector of dimension d, then the number of variables in (10) becomes d×
#unknowns.
Dataset #unknowns (10) #equations in (10)
(in Section 5) (= #data items in local dataset) (= #central epochs k)
Pima 30 20
Breast Cancer 19 5
Banknote Authentication 39 1
Adult Income 1628 120
Skin/NonSkin 9802 20
Credit Card Fraud Detection 12816 30
MNIST 10,000 639 (MLP), 193 (CNN)
CIFAR-10 10,000 50 (CNN), 100 (ResNet)
CIFAR-100 10,000 100 (ResNet)
and hence improve the learning accuracy, each trainer can freely employ any data augmentation
technique in the local training process. For example, a data item such as an image can be rotated,
sheared, or flipped (or even mixed up as in [25]) so that the data volume is significantly increased.
Using other optimizers. Instead of SGD, the trainers in our SNT and FNT systems can use
other optimizers such as RMSProp [26] or Adam [27], because only the weights are sent from each
trainer to the next, as in the FNT system, or to the server in the SNT system. In our experiments
we use both SGD and Adam as optimizers.
4.4 Additional hedges for our systems
In the above sections, we have consider the securities of our system against the honest-but-curious
server (for the SNT system) with respect to data secrecy in Theorem 1; and against the collusions
of trainers (for both SNT and FNT systems) with respect to data inversion given weight parameters
in Theorems 2 and 4.
Below, we discuss a potential issue and additional hedges related to the SNT and FNT systems.
The potential issue. In our system each trainer sends out a set of trained weights. While exactly
inverting the data from these weight parameters can be hard as shown above, the weights may
potentially leak some information on the training data.
Known impossibility [28]. A “perfect” notion of privacy, known as the “Dalenius desideratum,”
states that the learning model (the neural network and its weight parameters in our case) should
reveal no more about the input to which it is applied than would have been known about this
input without applying the model. Unfortunately, it has been shown that this kind of “perfect”
privacy cannot be achieved by any useful learning model [28]. As a related note, if all trainers in
our systems do nothing but only transmit uniformly random weights, then the systems have perfect
weight privacy, but no utility at all.
Given the above impossibility result, below we survey and discuss how to use orthogonal works in
the literature to create hedges protecting the weight privacy in our systems. These hedges (either
one or more) can be deployed locally at each trainer depending on the specific application at hand.
Hedge 1: adding differential privacy. It is possible to make the shared weights differentially
private, by either adding Laplace or Gaussian noises to the local gradients as in [5, 9, 10], when
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updating the weight parameters at each trainer; or using the classical technique of output pertur-
bation as in [29]. When public non-labeled data is available, each trainer can also use the technique
in [7] locally. The strong composition theorem [30] can be used when multiple differentially private
weights are sent subsequently. Differential privacy will make the shared weights less dependent on
any specific data item, thus making each local dataset more protected. With this hedge, we need
to accept a trade-off (e.g. as reported in [31]) between testing accuracy and privacy, because noises
are introduced into the training process.
Hedge 2: dropouts for privacy. Dropout [32] is the technique of randomly dropping neural
nodes along with their connections from the neural network during training. Dropout makes each
node in the neural network less depend on the training data, so intuitively having a similar effect as
differential privacy as observed in [33]. Besides that, it has been known as a regularization method
to prevent overfitting (see Hedge 3 below). In Section 5, the trainers in our systems make extensive
use of dropouts.
Hedge 3: no overfitting. Each trainer should care about whether the weight it sends out overfits
its local data or not. This is because overfitting may lead to attacks as reported in [34]. Overfitting
can be prevented by each trainer via locally monitoring the training and testing accuracies and, if
necessary, employing e.g. regularization as suggested in [34] or dropouts as in Hedge 2. For example,
in our experiments on UCI’s Breast Cancer, Banknote Authentication, Skin/NonSkin and MNIST
datasets in Section 5 below, the testing accuracies are relatively close to the training ones (all are
≥ 98%), meaning no overfitting, so that the trainers are protected by this hedge.
Hedge 4: anonymous transmission. The origin of the weight parameters is not needed for the
collaborative training process of our systems. Indeed, each trainer only needs to know the weight
parameters from some previous trainer. Therefore, it is advised to hide the origin of the weight
parameters of a previous trainer from the next trainer. While this can be generally accomplished by
anonymous communication techniques (see e.g. [35] and the references therein), in the SNT system,
the server can help by just keeping the origin secret. For this hedge to be applicable, we need the
number of honest trainers larger than (>) 1.
Hedge 5: locally preventive attack. Finally, each trainer itself is free to locally conduct any
preventive attack before its weight transmission and deploy any corresponding dedicated mitigation
if necessary to protect the weight.
Effects against concrete attacks. First, consider the following scenario. An honest-but-curious
trainer A receives a set of weight parameters from some previous trainer, and A applies its own
data on the received weight parameters W , with the goal of checking whether the data is in the
training set producing W . Hedge 4 hides the origin of W , so in turn protecting the origin of the
training data used to produce the weight parameters. As a consequence, the attacker cannot know
which trainer owns the data. In addition, Hedges 1 and 2 help protecting W in terms of differential
privacy, so that W does not depend heavily on any specific data item.
Second, consider the membership inference attack as in [34]. It is worth noting that outsiders
(not the trainers) cannot mount the membership inference attack in our setting, because each
trainer only uses its own data so that shadow training as in [34] is not possible. Only an insider
(some trainer) can mount the membership inference attack. Hedges 1, 2 and 3 have been already
known in [34] as countermeasures for the attack. Hedge 4 has the same effect as above. Note that
Hedges 1, 2, and 3 are concrete instantiations of Hedge 5. And as an additional example of Hedge
13
5, each trainer can locally deploy the technique of adversarial regularization proposed in [36], so
that the predictions of the neural network model and its weight W become hard to be exploited.
5 Experiments
To show the general applicability of our systems, we conduct experiments on various datasets
including UCI datasets, and image datasets (MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100).
Environment. For the UCI datasets, we employ a laptop and only run our programs on its CPU
(Intel Core i7-2860QM, 2.5GHz). For the experiment with the MNIST dataset, we employ a machine
with Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2660 v3 @ 2.60GHz with Cuda-8.0 and GPU Tesla K40m; with
Python 2.7.12 distributed in Anaconda 4.2.0 (64-bit). We assume a 1 Gbps channel between the
trainers and the server (in Figure 2) and between the trainers (in Figure 4).
Symmetric encryption. For the SNT system, we use AES-128-CBC encryption in OpenSSL
which satisfies security against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA). The secret symmetric key has 128
bits.
Random partitions of the original dataset. In below experiments for UCI, MNIST and CIFAR
datasets, the trainers hold local training datasets which are distributed approximately identically,
done via randomly shuffling and equally partitioning the original training dataset. In addition, for
UCI datasets, the labels in the testing set are chosen with the ratio of classes roughly equivalent to
the original dataset, done via using the train test split function of sklearn. More details are
given below.
Equivalent distribution of classes is the case of high interest when trainers (oganizations) col-
laborate. Indeed, each trainer may have insufficient data (of a class) for good training, but should
not have no data of that class at all. Taking the credit card fraud detection for example, if a credit
card company has no fraud transaction at all, then there is little reason why it has to collaborate.
5.1 Experiments with UCI datasets
Using our systems (both SNT and FNT), we conduct experiments on UCI datasets, and the results
for the accuracy and F-score are given in Table 4. Our accuracy and F-score are better than the
results reported in [6]. This is possibly due to the fact that our systems, while protecting data
privacy, do not reduce the accuracy of the underlying learning algorithm (as proved in Theorems 3
and 5). Below are details of each dataset and its corresponding experiment. In the following neural
networks, the activation function used in the hidden nodes is the rectified linear unit (ReLU) and
the sigmoid function is used at the output nodes. The percentage of label 0 (or 1 if this percentage
is higher) is reported in Table 4 approximately holds for all training and testing datasets.
Pima (diabetes). We use a neural network with the following architecture: 8 (input) - 512 -
dropout (0.6) - 64 - dropout (0.4) - 1 (output). Namely, the 8 features (as real numbers) from
each data item are fed to the input layer, which is connected to 512 hidden neural nodes. Next,
the 512 hidden nodes are connected to 64 hidden nodes with a dropout rate of 0.6, and so forth.
This neural network consists of 37,505 trainable parameters. To ensure the replicability of re-
sults, we fix the random seed of Python as random.seed(12345), the numpy random seed as
numpy.random.seed(15), and the tensorflow seed as tensorflow.set random seed(1234). The
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Table 4. Comparison with previous results of Aono et al. [6] for encrypted data.
UCI Known accuracy Known F-score Percentage of label 0 Our system accuracy Our system F-score
Dataset Name (in [6], data privacy is preserved) (or label 1 if higher) (data privacy is preserved)
Pima (diabetes) 80.70% 0.688525 64.29% 85.06% 0.763636
Breast Cancer 98.20% 0.962406 64.04% 99.31% 0.989304
Banknote Authentication 98.40% 0.984615 55.97% 100.0% 1.0
Adult Income 81.97% 0.526921 76.38% 85.90% 0.664362
Skin/NonSkin 93.89% 0.960130 79.53% 99.95% 0.998655
original dataset of 768 records (500 data items with label 0, and 268 with label 1) is randomly split
in a ratio of 8:2 for training of 614 records and testing of 154 records (99 data items with label 0,
and 55 with label 1) via using the train test split function of sklearn. Moreover, we envision
the number of trainers to be L = 20 in our systems, so the training set is split into 20 parts, each (of
at least 30 records) held by a distributed trainer. The Adam optimizer is used with a fixed learning
rate of 0.0002 and each trainer uses a batch size of 128 data items. Each distributed trainer runs
150 local epochs on its own data before passing its encrypted weights to the server (or the next
trainer). The number of central epochs is 20, meaning that each trainer uploads and downloads the
encrypted weights 20 times from the server in SNT (or from the previous trainer in FNT). It takes
less than 7 minutes for the system to finish its operations.
The use of train test split function of sklearn in the Pima dataset is the same for other
UCI datasets below.
Breast Cancer. We use a neural network with the following architecture: 9 (input) - 32 - dropout
(0.1) - 40 - dropout (0.2) - 64 - dropout (0.4) - 64 - dropout (0.4) - 64 - dropout (0.4) - 8 - 4
- 1 (output). This neural network consists of 14,785 trainable parameters. The random seeds are
set as numpy.random.seed(15), random.seed(12345), and tensorflow.set random seed(1234).
The original dataset is randomly split into a training set of 391 records and a testing set of 292
records. The training set is further split randomly into 20 parts, each (of at least 19 records) held
by a distributed trainer. The Adam optimizer is used with a fixed learning rate of 0.0002 and each
trainer uses a batch size of 128 data items. Each distributed trainer runs 40 local epochs on its own
data before passing its encrypted weights to the server (or the next trainer). The number of central
epochs is 5, meaning that each trainer uploads and downloads five times the encrypted weights
from the server in SNT (or from the previous trainer in FNT). It takes less than 1 minute for the
system to finish.
Banknote Authentication. We use a neural network with the following architecture: 4 (input)
- 128 - dropout (0.7) - 64 - dropout (0.5) - 64 - dropout (0.5) - 1 (output). This neural network
consists of 13,121 trainable parameters. The random seeds are set as numpy.random.seed(15),
random.seed(12345), and tensorflow.set random seed(1234). We split the dataset into two
parts: a training set with 786 records and a testing set with 586 records. The training set is further
split randomly into 20 parts, each (of at least 39 records) held by a distributed trainer. The Adam
optimizer is used with a fixed learning rate of 0.0002 and each trainer uses a batch size of 128 data
items. Each distributed trainer runs 70 local epochs on its own data before passing its encrypted
weight to the server (or the next trainer). The number of central epochs is 1, meaning that each
trainer uploads and downloads 1 the encrypted weights once at the server in SNT (or from the
previous trainer in FNT). It takes less than 11 seconds for the system to finish.
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Adult Income. We use a neural network with the following architecture: 14 (input) - 64 - dropout
(0.4) - 32 - dropout (0.2) - 1 (output). This neural network consists of 3,073 trainable parameters.
The random seeds are set as numpy.random.seed(4) and tensorflow.set random seed(1234).
The training set of 32561 records is split randomly into 20 parts, each (of at least 1268 records)
held by a distributed trainer. The testing set is of 16281 records. The Adam optimizer is used with
a fixed learning rate of 0.0002 and each trainer uses a batch size of 128 data items. Each distributed
trainer runs 14 local epochs on its own data before passing its encrypted weights to the server (or
the next trainer). The number of central epochs is 120, meaning that each trainer uploads and
downloads 120 times the encrypted weights from the server in SNT (or from the previous trainer
in FNT). It takes around 100 minutes for the system to finish.
Skin/NonSkin. We use a neural network with the following architecture: 3 (input) - 64 - dropout
(0.4) - 32 - dropout (0.2) - 1 (output). This neural network consists of 2,369 trainable parameters.
The random seeds are set as numpy.random.seed(15), tensorflow.set random seed(1234), and
random.seed(12345). The original dataset of 245057 records is randomly split in a ratio of 8:2 for
training (196045 records) and testing (49012 records). The training set is further split randomly
into 20 parts, each of at least 9802 records held by a distributed trainer. The Adam optimizer is
used with a fixed learning rate of 0.0002 and each trainer uses a batch size of 128 data items. Each
distributed trainer runs 10 local epochs on its own data before passing its encrypted weight to the
server (or the next trainer). The number of central epochs is 20, meaning each trainer uploads and
downloads 20 times the encrypted weights from the server in SNT (or from the previous trainer in
FNT). It takes less than 75 minutes for the system to finish.
Interlude: Credit Card Fraud Detection. The dataset is provided in [39] and consists of credit
card transactions by European users over 2 days. There are 30 features in each transaction, including
the time and amount of the transaction. We randomly split the original dataset in a ratio of 9:1
for training and testing. Precisely, the numbers of labels 0 and labels 1 in the original dataset are
284,315 and 492 (i.e. 99.82725% of 0s) respectively; in the training test those are 255,880 and 446 (i.e.
99.83% of 0s); and in the testing set those are 28,435 and 46 (i.e. 99.83848% of 0s) respectively. Each
transaction is labeled by 0 (normal) or 1 (fraud). We envision the number of trainners to be L = 20
in our systems, so the training set is further split into 20 parts each consisting of approximately
12,816 transactions. Each trainer employs a neural network with the following architecture: 30
(input) - 64 - dropout (0.4) - 32 - dropout (0.2) - 1, with 4,097 parameters. The Adam optimizer
is used with a learning rate of 0.0002 and a batch size of 128. The seeds for randomness are set as
numpy.random.seed(15), random.seed(12345), and tensorflow.set random seed(1234). Each
trainer uses 10 local epochs before sending the weights out. The number of central epochs is 30.
The running time of the system is around 65 minutes. The testing accuracy is around 99.96% with
a corresponding F-score of 0.8.
5.2 Experiments with the MNIST dataset
Below are experiments using an MLP and a CNN performed with the MNIST dataset.
Dataset. We use the MNIST dataset [3] containing 28× 28 images of hand written numbers. We
assume five trainers, namely L = 5 in Figures 2 4, each of which holds a portion of 10,000 images
uniformly and randomly split from the original MNIST dataset. We do that by randomly shuffling
the indexes of the training dataset and splitting it into 5 portions. The validation set contains
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Fig. 5. Convolutional neural network of LeNet-type [37, 38] (left) and its testing accuracy graph
produced by 5 trainers in our systems (right).
Table 5. Timings in experiments with MNIST.
Network model T
(i)
original SGD T
(i)
uploadCtxt T
(i)
downloadCtxt T
(i)
enc T
(i)
dec
MLP [38] 0.3 (min.) 0.05 (sec.) 0.05 (sec.) 0.12 (sec.) 0.06 (sec.)
CNN [38] 3.3 (sec.) 0.051 (sec.) 0.051 (sec.) 0.13 (sec.) 0.06 (sec.)
10,000 images and the test set contains 10,000 images. Because the training set of each trainer is
insufficient in size (relative to the validation set and the test set), the trainers wish to learn from
the combined training set with a a total of 5 · 10, 000 = 50, 000 images).
Calculation of running time. On the basis of Figures 2 and 4, the running time Tour system of
our system can be expressed as
Tour system=nepoch
L∑
i=1
(
T
(i)
original SGD + T
(i)
uploadCtxt + T
(i)
downloadCtxt + T
(i)
enc + T
(i)
dec
)
(11)
in which nepoch is the number of epochs, where an epoch is a loop over all data items in the combined
dataset. For trainer i, T
(i)
original SGD is the running time of the original SGD over the local dataset
of the trainer, T
(i)
uploadCtxt is the time to upload a ciphertext to the server (or the next trainer);
T
(i)
downloadCtxt is the time to download a ciphertext from the server (or the previous trainer), T
(i)
enc is
the time for one symmetric encryption, and T
(i)
dec is the time for one symmetric decryption.
Using an MLP network. In this experiment, each trainer runs the MLP code in [38] with a
batch of one data item over its dataset of 10,000 images. The number of hidden nodes is 500. The
number of weight parameters is identical to the number of gradient parameters, which is 397,510.
We use Python’s package pickle to convert these weight parameters as Python objects into a byte
stream for encryption, resulting in a plaintext with a size of around 4.33 MB. The corresponding
ciphertext is also pickled, having a size of around 5.78 MB, which is sent via our 1 Gbps network
in 0.05 seconds. Table 5 gives the approximate timings of trainers 1 ≤ i ≤ 5.
In our experiment, at epoch number 639, Client 1 obtains the best validation score of 1.63% with a
test performance of 1.64%. Therefore, the accuracy over the validation set is 100− 1.63 = 98.37%
and the accuracy over the testing set is 100 − 1.64 = 98.36%. The running time of the system to
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obtain the result, theoretically estimated via (11), is
Tour system
= nepoch
L∑
i=1
(
T
(i)
original SGD + T
(i)
uploadCtxt + T
(i)
downloadCtxt + T
(i)
enc + T
(i)
dec
)
= 639 · 5 ·
(
0.3 +
0.05
60
+
0.05
60
+
0.12
60
+
0.06
60
)
≈ 973.41 (minutes)
≈ 16.22 (hours).
The running time of the original code for SGD over the combined dataset of 5 · 104 images is
around 32 seconds per epoch. Thus, when nepoch = 639, we have Toriginal SGD = 32 · 639 (seconds) =
5.68 (hours). Therefore,
Tour system
Toriginal SGD
=
16.22
5.68
≈ 2.86 < 3,
which supports the claim of experimental efficiency in Section 1.2.
Using a CNN. We make use of a CNN (LeNet-type [37,38]) as depicted in Figure 5. Each trainer
runs the LeNet-type code in [38] with a batch of 500 data items over its dataset of 10,000 images.
The number of weight parameters is 431,080, which is the sum of 20× 5× 5 + 20 (first convolution
layer), 50× 20× 5× 5 + 50 (second convolution layer), 50× 4× 4× 500 + 500 (fully connected), and
500 × 10 + 10. We use pickle to convert these weight parameters as Python objects into a byte
stream for encryption, resulting in a plaintext with a size of around 4.73 MB. The corresponding
ciphertext is also pickled, having a size of around 6.31 MB, which is sent via our 1 Gbps network
in around 0.051 seconds. Table 5 gives the approximate timings of trainers 1 ≤ i ≤ 5.
In our experiment, at epoch number 193, the accuracy over the validation set is 99.1% and
the accuracy over the testing set is 99.17%. The running time of the system to obtain the result,
theoretically estimated via (11), is
Tour system
= nepoch
L∑
i=1
(
T
(i)
original SGD + T
(i)
uploadCtxt + T
(i)
downloadCtxt + T
(i)
enc + T
(i)
dec
)
= 193 · 5 · (3.3 + 0.051 + 0.051 + 0.13 + 0.06)
≈ 3466 (seconds)
≈ 0.96 (hours).
Thus,
Tour system
Toriginal SGD
≈ 0.96
0.89
< 1.1,
supporting the claim of experimental efficiency in Section 1.2.
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Table 6. Timings in experiments with CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100.
Network model, Dataset T
(i)
original T
(i)
uploadCtxt T
(i)
downloadCtxt T
(i)
enc T
(i)
dec
CNN, CIFAR-10 37 (sec.) 0.056 (sec.) 0.056 (sec.) 0.130 (sec.) 0.06 (sec.)
ResNet-20v1, CIFAR-10 59 (sec.) 0.013 (sec.) 0.013 (sec.) 0.064 (sec.) 0.06 (sec.)
ResNet-32v1, CIFAR-10 87 (sec.) 0.023 (sec.) 0.023 (sec.) 0.066 (sec.) 0.06 (sec.)
ResNet-44v1, CIFAR-100 122 (sec.) 0.032 (sec.) 0.032 (sec.) 0.091 (sec.) 0.085 (sec.)
ResNet-110v2, CIFAR-100 322 (sec.) 0.165 (sec.) 0.165 (sec.) 0.179 (sec.) 0.138 (sec.)
∗In the table, the time for training over plain local data T(i)original dominates the others.
5.3 Experiments with the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets
The CIFAR-10 dataset [40] consists of 50,000 RGB images of shape 32 × 32 × 3 for training, and
10,000 RGB images of the same shape for testing.
The CIFAR-100 dataset is just like the CIFAR-10, except it has 100 classes (of dolphin, cock-
roach, motorcycle etc.) containing 600 images each. There are 500 training images and 100 testing
images per class, so that the training dataset and testing dataset have respectively 50,000 and
10,000 images as above.
We assume there are 5 trainers, each of which holds a portion of 10,000 images randomly and
uniformly split from the original 50,000 training ones. Therefore, the local training datasets of the
trainers have approximately identical distribution of labels.
Each trainer in our system re-uses the Keras official example codes [41] (of CNN) and [42]
(of ResNetv1 [43] and ResNetv2 [44]) for training and testing over the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
datasets. The running times of each trainer is given at Table 6 in which the time for local training
over plain data dominates the others of cryptographic operations and transmissions, i.e.
T
(i)
original  T(i)uploadCtxt + T(i)downloadCtxt + T(i)enc + T(i)dec.
Therefore, the running time of our system is approximate that of the original one where all data
items are centralized, namely,
Tour system ≈ Toriginal
in the experiments. More details are given below.
Experiments with CIFAR-10
Using the CNN of [41]. The number of weight parameters is 1,250,858 with following network
architecture: CONV – ReLU – CONV – ReLU – MaxPooling2D – Dropout(0.25) – CONV – ReLU
– CONV – ReLU – MaxPooling2D – Dropout(0.25) – Flatten – Dense(512) – ReLU – Dropout(0.5)
– Dense(10) – softmax. It is reported in [41] that the network reaches testing accuracy of around
79% after 50 epochs.
In our experiment, we consider 5 trainers, each uses the same network as above. The local
number of epochs at each trainer is 5, and the central number of epoch is 10, so that each data
item is used 5 × 10 = 50 times (same as the original [41], of 50 epochs as described above). The
ciphertext encrypting the weight parameters seen as a numpy array is of 6.9 MB, which is sent via
our 1 Gbps network in around 0.056 seconds. The time for symmetric encryption and decryption is
given in Table 6 and it is worth noting that the local training time at each trainer T
(i)
original dominates
other timings.
19
(a) Experiments with CIFAR-10 (b) Experiments with CIFAR-100
Fig. 6. Testing accuracy graphs of our systems (5 trainers each having 10,000 training images) with
various neural network architectures.
The testing accuracy graph obtained by the above execution of our system is depicted in Figure
6(a) in which the testing accuracy per central epoch of each trainer is given. The maximum of
testing accuracy of 79.5% is obtained at epoch 49, complying with the original result in [41].
Using ResNet-20v1. The number of weight parameters is 274,442 and the Keras code is at [42].
Each of the 5 trainers runs 2 local epochs before sending the weight out. The number of central
epochs is 100, so that each data item is used 2×100 = 200 as in the original code [42]. The ciphertext
encrypting the weight parameters seen as a numpy array is of 1.6 MB, and the symmetric encryption
and decryption times are given in Table 6.
Each trainer in our experiment schedules the learning rate as follows: 10−3, 10−4, 10−5, 10−6,
10−6/2 if the central epoch is correspondingly in the ranges [0, 40], [41, 60], [61, 80], [81, 90], [91, 99].
These ranges are half of the ranges in [42] because we use 2 as the number of local epochs at each
trainer.
The testing accuracy graph obtained by the above execution of our system with ResNet-20 is
depicted in Figure 6(a) in which the testing accuracy per central epoch of each trainer is given. The
maximum of testing accuracy of 92.13%, complying with the result reported in [42], is obtained at
central epoch 68.
Using ResNet-32v1. The number of weight parameters is 470,218 and the Keras code is at [42].
The ciphertext encrypting the weight parameters seen as a numpy array is of 2.8 MB, and the
symmetric encryption and decryption times are given in Table 6. The number of local epochs,
central epochs and the learning rate schedule at each trainer are the same as ResNet-20.
The testing accuracy graph obtained by the above execution of our system with ResNet-32 is
depicted in Figure 6(a) in which the testing accuracy per central epoch of each trainer is given. The
maximum of testing accuracy of 92.28%, complying with the result reported in [42], is obtained at
central epoch 97.
Experiments with CIFAR-100
Using ResNet-44v1. The number of weight parameters is 671,844 and the Keras code is at [42].
The ciphertext encrypting the weight parameters seen as a numpy array is of 3.9 MB, and the
symmetric encryption and decryption times are given in Table 6. The number of local epochs,
central epochs and the learning rate schedule at each trainer are the same as above.
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The testing accuracy graph obtained by the above execution of our system with ResNet-44 is
depicted in Figure 6(b) in which the testing accuracy per central epoch of each trainer is given. The
maximum of testing accuracy of 70.69%, complying with the result reported in [45], is obtained at
central epoch 91.
Using ResNet-110v2. The number of weight parameters is 3,346,340 and the Keras code is
at [42]. The ciphertext encrypting the weight parameters seen as a numpy array is of 20 MB, and
the symmetric encryption and decryption times are given in Table 6. The number of local epochs,
central epochs and the learning rate schedule at each trainer are the same as above.
The testing accuracy graph obtained by the above execution of our system with ResNet-110v2
is depicted in Figure 6(b) in which the testing accuracy per central epoch of each trainer is given.
The maximum of testing accuracy of 74.75%, complying with the result reported in [45], is obtained
at central epoch 72.
6 Conclusion
We have conctructed privacy-preserving systems in which multiple machine-learning trainers can
use SGD or its variants over the combined dataset of all trainers without having to share the
local dataset of each trainer. Differing from previous works, our systems make use of the weight
parameters rather than the gradient parameters. The experimental results show that our systems
are practically efficient in terms of computation and communication, and effective in terms of
accuracy.
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